Terms-of-Trade and the funding of adaptation to climate change and variability: an empirical analysis by Schenker, Oliver & Stephan, Gunter
Dis cus si on Paper No. 12-056
Terms-of-Trade and the  
Funding of Adaptation to  
Climate Change and Variability
An Empirical Analysis
Oliver Schenker and Gunter Stephan
Dis cus si on Paper No. 12-056
Terms-of-Trade and the  
Funding of Adaptation to  
Climate Change and Variability
An Empirical Analysis
Oliver Schenker and Gunter Stephan
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp12056.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
 
 
Non-technical summary 
 
Regional economies significantly diverge in their exposure as well as their capacity to adapt 
to climate change and variability. Between 1984 and 2004, if measured in percent GDP, costs 
of climate impacts were three times smaller in high-income countries than in low- to middle-
income ones, where 80 percent of the world population lives.  
The COP17 meeting at Durban once again demonstrated that the world community presently 
is unable to establish an international agreement on greenhouse gas abatement, which extends 
the Kyoto Protocol. This makes adaptation an urgent option for insuring against the threat of 
global warming. However, adaptation to climate change is costly and many developing coun-
tries lack the financial, institutional and the human resources for coping effectively with cli-
mate change.  
Fairness and equity are major arguments why the industrialized countries should assist the 
developing countries. But there are further ones. Adaptation can help to ensure that the 
developing countries remain partners for economic growth, global governance and 
international trade. In particular, adaptation can moderate the terms-of-trade effects of climate 
related events as for example the one observed in 2008. After six years of drought Australia’s 
rice production collapsed almost completely. Combined with other factors this caused a 
doubling of the world market price of rice, which led to panicked hoarding and violent 
protests. Indeed, even if free trade can curb climate change impacts, output losses in one 
single country might cause rising world market prices and the resulting terms-of-trade effects 
can pertain to real income losses in almost any country. 
This paper analyses the interrelationship between international trade, regional adaptation and 
North-to-South transfers for funding adaptation within the framework of a dynamic computa-
ble general equilibrium model, where impacts of climate change depend on changes in precip-
itation and temperature. If all regions, even the least developed ones, own the necessary re-
sources for adapting optimally to climate change and variability, by mid-century less than 
10% of the regions’ GDP would be invested for avoiding almost 40% of climate change dam-
ages. In absolute terms global adaptation expenditure would account to more than 85 billion 
US$ by 2050. This has measurable effects on the regions’ competitiveness as well as on the 
terms-of-trade. If, however, the developing world does not own sufficient resources for adapt-
ing optimally to climate change, as is to expected, funding of adaptation, which is an element 
of international climate policy, can make sense from an economic perspective. In particular 
the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is fulfilled as aggregated welfare gains at least compensate the 
costs of providing financial assistance for adaptation. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die Exposition, wie auch die Möglichkeiten, sich an den Klimawandel anzupassen, variieren 
signifikant zwischen verschiedenen Ländern. Zwischen 1984 und 2004 waren die Kosten aus 
Klimaschäden in Industrieländern dreimal kleiner als in Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern, 
in denen 80 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung leben. 
Die Klimakonferenz Ende 2012 in Durban, Südafrika, hat einmal mehr gezeigt, dass die 
Weltgemeinschaft derzeit nicht in der Lage ist, sich auf ein Abkommen zur Reduktion der 
weltweiten Treibhausgasemissionen, dass über die Ziele des Kyoto-Protokolls hinausgeht, zu 
einigen. Das macht Anpassung zu einer wichtigen Handlungsoption, um sich gegen die Be-
drohungen des Klimawandels zu schützen. Diese Anpassungsmaßnahmen sind allerdings mit 
Kosten verbunden und vielen Entwicklungsländern fehlen die finanziellen und institutionellen 
Ressourcen. 
Gerechtigkeitsüberlegungen sind wichtige Argumente, warum die Industrie- die Entwick-
lungsländer unterstützen sollten,  aber nicht die einzigen. Die Finanzierung von Anpassungs-
maßnahmen hilft sicherzustellen, dass die Terms-of-Trade Effekte des Klimawandels redu-
ziert werden und die Entwicklungsländer so Handelspartner der Industriestaaten bleiben kön-
nen. Ein Ereignis aus Jahre 2008 zeigt das exemplarisch: Infolge einer sechsjährigen Dürre 
kam die australischen Reisproduktion fast vollständig zum Erliegen. Gemeinsam mit anderen 
Faktoren führte das zu einer Verdoppelung des Reispreises auf dem Weltmarkt, was zu Pa-
nikkäufen und gewalttätigen Protesten in mehreren Entwicklungsländern führte. Auch wenn 
Freihandel helfen kann, die Effekte des Klimawandels zu dämpfen, zeigt dieses Beispiel, dass 
Produktionsrückgänge in einem einzelnen Land zu steigenden Weltmarktpreisen und die dar-
aus folgenden Terms-of-Trade Effekte zu realen Einkommensverlusten führen können. 
Dieses Papier analysiert die Beziehung zwischen internationalem Handel, regionaler Anpas-
sung und Nord-Süd-Transfers zur Finanzierung von Anpassung mit Hilfe eines dynamischen 
berechenbaren allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodelles. Unter der Annahme, dass all Regionen, 
sogar die ärmsten, die nötigen Ressourcen besäßen, sich optimal an den Klimawandel anzu-
passen, müsste in der Mitte des 21. Jahrhunderts weniger als 10% des BIP einer Region dafür 
aufgewendet werden, um fast 40% der zu erwartenden Schäden des Klimawandels zu vermei-
den. In absoluten Zahlen entsprächen die globalen Anpassungskosten zur Mitte des Jahrhun-
derts ungefähr 85 Milliarden US Dollar. Das würde einen messbaren Effekt auf die Wettbe-
werbsfähigkeit und die Terms-of-Trade einer Region haben. Wenn nun wie zu erwarten die 
Entwicklungsländer nicht über die nötigen Ressourcen verfügen, kann die Finanzierung von 
Anpassungsmaßnahmen durch die Industriestaaten aus ökonomischer Sicht Sinn machen. Für 
gewisse Transferbeträge ist das Hicks-Kaldor Kriterium, d.h. die aggregierten Wohlfahrtsge-
winne erlauben eine Kompensierung der Finanzierungskosten, erfüllt.
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1 Introduction 
Regional economies significantly diverge in their exposure as well as their capacity to adapt 
to climate change and variability.1 Between 1984 and 2004, if measured in percent GDP, 
costs of climate impacts were three times smaller in high-income countries than in low- to 
middle-income ones, where 80 percent of the world population lives (see Burton et al., 2006). 
This has several reasons: First, developing countries are mostly located in tropical and sub-
tropical latitudes, where climate events such as heat waves and drought periods are more se-
vere than in the North. Second, much of their national income is generated in climate-
sensitive sectors like agriculture and tourism. Finally, population growth and the expansion 
into high-hazard zones increased the number of people at risk of climate change disruption. 
The COP17 meeting at Durban once again demonstrated that the world community presently 
is unable to establish an international agreement on greenhouse gas abatement, which extends 
the Kyoto Protocol. This makes adaptation an urgent option for insuring against the threat of 
global warming. However, adaptation to climate change is costly and many developing coun-
tries lack the financial, institutional and the human resources for coping effectively with cli-
mate change. Stern (2006) calculates that adaptation costs worldwide account to 4 up to 37 
billion US$ annually. The World Bank (2007) estimates that 10 to 40 billion US$ are needed 
per year. The UNFCCC (2007) finally projects that by 2030 annual adaptation costs will be in 
the order of 46 to 171 billion US$. Thereby, 28 to 67 billion US$ are attributed to the devel-
oping countries. 
Fairness and equity are major arguments why the industrialized countries should assist the 
developing countries. But there are further ones. Adaptation can help to ensure that the 
developing countries remain partners for economic growth, global governance and 
international trade. In particular, adaptation can moderate the terms-of-trade effects of climate 
related events as for example the one observed in 2008. After six years of drought Australia’s 
rice production collapsed almost completely. Combined with other factors this caused a 
doubling of the world market price of rice, which led to panicked hoarding and violent 
protests. Indeed, even if free trade can curb climate change impacts, output losses in one 
single country might cause rising world market prices and the resulting terms-of-trade effects 
                                                          
1 Exposure depends on climatic conditions and the wealth of a society. Capacity is a society’s ability to adapt 
to climatic conditions, either by reducing harm, or exploiting beneficial opportunities, or both, which again 
depends on the society’s wealth, education and institutions. 
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can pertain to real income losses in almost any country.2 
This is a problem for the poorest. These countries do not own the necessary resources for 
coping with the risks of climate change. Last but not least for that reason several funds have 
been established for supporting adaptation in these countries: the Least Developed Countries 
Fund, which should support the 49 least developed countries, the Special Climate Change 
Fund, which provides financial assistance to all developing countries, and, based on Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the Adaptation Fund. Finally, the Green Climate Fund was established 
at the recent COP17 meeting, through which 100 billion US$ annually should be provided for 
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.  
Contrary to mitigation adaptation is highly diverse. Adaptation includes the implementation 
of new management practices but also the investment into the protection of infrastructure. 
Some has the character of a private, some of a local public good. Some involves public and 
some private institutions. This explains why our knowledge on how to incorporate adaptation 
into integrated assessment models (IAM) of climate change still is rudimentary (Agrawala et 
al., 2011, Patt et al, 2010). Today, there are two approaches mainly: Bosello et al. (2010) view 
adaptation as anticipatory measure, which requires the accumulation of adaptation capital 
stocks. Examples are the building of dikes for flood protection. In contrast de Bruin et al. 
(2009) consider adaptation as reactive measure, which is effective almost immediately. Typi-
cally, this applies to agriculture, where climate impacts can be moderated through changing 
crops or adjusting planting and harvesting times. 
Our analysis focuses on reactive adaptation. First, we are interested in the interplay between 
adaptation and international trade rather than the timing of costs and benefits of adaptation. 
Second, reactive adaptation is of particular importance in case of agriculture, which is an 
important source of the developing countries’ national income. McCarl (2007) estimates that 
within the next twenty years 5 to 12 billion US$ have to be invested annually into adaptation 
for counterbalancing most of climate change impacts on agriculture. This indicates that the 
developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change and might become even 
more vulnerable without sufficient investment into adaptation. 
This paper analyzes the interrelationship between climate change adaptation, terms-of-trade 
and adaptation funding. It applies MITACC, a dynamic computable general equilibrium Mod-
                                                          
2  Schenker (2010) shows that in countries like the US, where market impacts are moderate, a significant frac-
tion of climate change related costs results from terms-of-trade deterioration. 
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el for evaluating International Trade and regional Adaptation to Climate Change. Section 2 
introduces the key features of the model. In particular, it explains at some detail, how adapta-
tion is made explicit in MITACC. Section 3 discusses the numerical specification of 
MITACC, and Section 4 introduces the scenarios upon which our counterfactual analysis is 
based. Results of the calculations are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Key Features of the Model3 
Many of the basic ideas and numerical parameters, which are used for the purpose of 
MITACC, are taken from the RICE (Nordhaus, 2010) and MERGE (Manne et al., 1995) IAM 
as well as from Schenker (2010). In common with these models MITACC provides a reduced-
form description of the regional economies, international trade and impacts of climate change. 
In contrast to the former ones MITACC combines a detailed representation of the regions’ 
ability to adapt to climate change with a top-down perspective on the remainder of the region-
al economies. 
2.1 A Short Overview 
The world economy is divided into nine regions (see Appendix, Table 1), which are linked 
through trade in commodities and capital flows. Some regions like Europe (EUR) or North 
America (NAF) are characterized by relatively high wealth and low vulnerability to climate 
change. Others such as Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) or South Asia (SOA) are less developed, but 
highly vulnerable. Each region is viewed as if a single agent maximizes the discounted utility 
of consumption over time. The time horizon exceeds through 2075 and time periods are five 
years in lengths. Each region produces two categories of commodities in two corresponding 
sectors: (1) vulnerable, which refers to the aggregate of goods and services, which are pro-
duced in climate vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, fishery, forestry and tourism, (2) non-
vulnerable, which denotes the aggregate output of sectors, which are almost insensitive to 
climate change like industrial manufacturing or financial services. 
Production of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable commodities is modeled through nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. Inputs into regional production are capital, 
labor and intermediate goods, which are region-specific and produced through inputs of vul-
nerable and non-vulnerable. Labor is mobile across sectors, but not across regions. Capital is 
traded on open international markets, which allows for shifting capital to regions with highest 
                                                          
3 A full description of the model as well as a copy of the GAMS code is available upon request. 
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marginal returns. The regions’ output of vulnerable and non-vulnerable can be used domesti-
cally and/or exported. We abstract from trade distortions, but apply Armington’s (1968) as-
sumption that imports and domestic products are imperfect substitutes. 
IAM typically express market impacts of climate change as percentage effects of total GDP 
(see Mastrandrea, 2010). In contrast, MITACC uses sector‐specific impact functions. Since by 
definition climate change affects the production of vulnerable goods only, impacts materialize 
as changes in output of vulnerable commodities. I.e., at any period t only the fraction 𝑉𝑟(𝑡) 
(1)  𝑉𝑟(𝑡) = 1/�1 + 𝑁𝑁𝑟(𝑡)� 
of gross production of vulnerable is at disposal in region r. Net-impacts 𝑁𝑁𝑟(𝑡) are market 
impacts, which can be observed and which depend, as discussed below, on regional gross 
damages (output changes in absence of adaptation), regional adaptation and adaptation costs. 
2.2 Making Adaptation Explicit 
Impacts of climate change can be reduced through adaptation, which, however, creates costs. 
In RICE damages, costs and benefits of adaptation are blended into a single number. 
However, for formulating adaptation as decision variable both have to be made explicit. 
Therefore, following de Bruin et al. (2009) net-impacts 𝑁𝑁𝑟(𝑡) are separated into its 
constituent elements by assuming: (1) gross impacts as well as costs and benefits of 
adaptation are independent and separable of each other, (2) all can be expressed in units of 
vulnerable goods. More precisely, let 𝐺𝑁𝑟(𝑡) denote gross impacts, i.e. the impacts in absence 
of adaptation, and let 0 ≤ Ar(𝑡) ≤ 1 denote endogenously chosen adaptation, which is 
measured as fraction of gross damages avoided. Then in region r at time t net-damages 
(2)   𝑁𝑁𝑟(𝑡) = (1 − 𝐴𝑟(𝑡))𝐺𝑁𝑟(𝑡) +  𝐴𝐶𝑟�𝐴𝑟(𝑡)� 
are the sum of adaptation costs ACr(Ar(𝑡)) and residual damages (1 − 𝐴𝑟(𝑡))𝐺𝑁𝑟(𝑡). 
Costs of adaptation are assumed to strictly increase with the level of adaptation  
(3)   𝐴𝐶𝑟(𝐴𝑟(𝑡)) =  𝛾𝑟𝐴𝑟(𝑡)𝛽𝑟, 
where 𝛾𝑟 is the price per unit of adaptation, expressed in terms of output of vulnerable. 𝛽𝑟 > 1 
determines the curvature of the adaptation cost function. Note, the decision for adapting opti-
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mally is solely determined by gross impacts 𝐺𝑁𝑟(𝑡) and the parameters of the adaptation cost 
function. Neither regional income nor output matters. 
3 Calibration 
3.1 Climate Data 
Two variables are important for the assessment of climate impacts on vulnerable sectors such 
as agriculture. These are changes in temperature and precipitation. We use data provided by 
the global climate model ECHAM5 (Roeckner et al., 2005). The ECHAM5 simulations, 
which are based on the IPCC SRES A1B emission scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), 
deliver monthly averages of both variables at a spatial resolution of about 200 km. Through 
aggregating these data to annual mean temperature and precipitation per region we observe 
that by mid-century the former Soviet Union (GUS) and North America (NAF) must await an 
increase of average surface temperature of about 3°C to 3.5°C.4 Middle East and North Africa 
(MEN) as well as Sub Saharan Africa (SAF) should anticipate an additional warming of about 
2.3°C, whereas for Oceania (OCE) only a moderate temperature increase of about 1.6°C is 
projected. 
Projections on precipitation are more uncertain and trends are not as linear as in case of 
temperature. In South Asia (SOA) for example precipitation will raise by 4% only, whereas 
North America (NAF) and GUS might expect an increase of approximately 8% to 11%. An 
exception is Middle East and North Africa (MEN), which is already a dry region and must 
face a further decline in precipitation. 
3.2 Climate Impacts 
Most Integrated Assessment models view net-impacts as function of temperature change only. 
However, production in sectors such as agriculture is exposed to changes in both temperature 
and precipitation. Now, since agriculture is the most important among vulnerable sectors, to 
construct the sectoral impact function let us rely on the climate response function as 
established by Mendelsohn and Schlessinger (1999) and refined by Cline (2007). 
The climate response function is a quadratic combination of temperature and precipitation and 
                                                          
4 In polar regions temperature increase will be higher than in lower latitudes. Since these regions are sparsely 
populated, climate impacts on these regions are probably overestimated. 
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determines net revenues per hectare.5 Taking the total differential gives for each region r and 
period t 
(4)  𝑁𝑁� 𝑟(𝑡) = 116𝑑𝑇𝑟(𝑡) −  9.9𝑇𝑟(𝑡)𝑑𝑇𝑟(𝑡) +  0.47𝑑𝑃𝑟(𝑡), 
where 𝑁𝑁� 𝑟(𝑡) denotes output changes, hence market impacts, which are determined by 
regional surface temperature 𝑇𝑟(𝑡) and marginal changes in regional temperature 𝑑𝑇𝑟(𝑡) and 
precipitation 𝑑𝑃𝑟(𝑡). 
Function (4) is derived from statistical estimates based on results of a crop model and a linear-
programming model of US farms. The latter includes adaptation measures like changing crop 
mixes, fertilizing and irrigation. Consequently, 𝑁𝑁� 𝑟(𝑡) must be interpreted as net-impact, 
which implicitly includes adaptation. However, for decomposing net-impacts into costs of 
adaptation and residual damages (see Section 2.2) information about gross-impacts and adap-
tation is needed. We assume that the functional forms of gross-impacts and net-impacts are 
identical, i.e., 
(5)  GDr(𝑡) = α1,r dTr(𝑡) − 𝛼2,r𝑇r(𝑡)dTr(𝑡) + α3,rdPr(𝑡). 
The impact coefficients α1,r,α2,r, α3,r are then determined together with the adaptation cost 
parameters 𝛾𝑟 and 𝛽𝑟 through calibration (see Appendix, Table A1). To this end a model is 
constructed (see de Bruin et al., 2009), which minimizes the discounted squared difference 
between the impacts 𝑁𝑁� 𝑟(𝑡), as given by Cline (2007), and net-impacts 𝑁𝑁𝑟(𝑡), which in-
clude explicitly made optimal adaptation. 
3.3 Economic Data 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions drive climate change. Although strongly depending 
on economic development, for the purpose of our analysis emissions and climate change are 
exogenously given. Projections are taken from the SRES A1B emission scenario (Nakice-
novic and Swart, 2000), which is the mostly used IPCC emission scenario and predicts an 
atmospheric CO2 concentration of about 550 ppm by 2050. 
                                                          
5  Mendelsohn and Schlessinger (1999) and Cline (2007) take CO2 fertilization effects on agriculture into ac-
count. Recent studies, however, show that these are smaller and more uncertain than previously thought (see 
Lee et al., 2011). They are neglected therefore. 
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Regional outputs, production structures, consumption and investment, factor endowments and 
trade flows are calibrated with GTAP 7.1 data (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). This data 
base provides a consistent representation of the 2004 world economy and contains infor-
mation on trade and production for 113 regions and 57 commodities, which are aggregated 
accordingly. Elasticities of substitution are also taken from the GTAP 7 data base (see Ap-
pendix, Table A2). For consistency growth rates from IPCC SRES are used. 
4 Scenarios 
Four scenarios are discussed in the following. The first one is called BASE. It serves as 
reference scenario and assumes that the world economy develops without being affected by 
climate change. The second scenario is called TUMB. It reflects what might happen, if there 
are climate impacts as projected by the ECHAM5 simulations, but agents behave as “dump 
farmers”. I.e., global warming distresses the regional economies, but agents do not respond 
and hence do not invest into adaptation. This is not a realistic assumption, but allows 
assessing the effectiveness of adaptation. 
The third scenario is called AUTO. As mentioned earlier, adaptation can create benefits, 
which are private to the single regions. Therefore self-interest suggests that some adaptation is 
made autonomously. AUTO considers the situation, where all regions own the necessary 
resources for optimally and autonomously investing into adaptation. Note, since in our 
framework adaptation is the only possibility to respond to climate change and benefits of 
adaptation are private to the single regions, AUTO establishes a Pareto-efficient solution. 
Generally it is expected that the developing world does not own sufficient resources for 
optimally adapting to the risks of climate change, and hence, that North-to-South transfers for 
financing adaptation are necessary. FUND, which is the short-cut of the fourth scenario, 
supposes that Europe (EUR), North America (NAF) and Oceania (OCE) steadily increase 
their financial contributions to Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF), South America (SAM) and South 
Asia (SOA), until they hand over 0.1% of their GDP from 2050 onwards. This would imply 
transferring 33 billion US$ annually, which is at the low end of what the UNFCCC (2007) has 
calculated. However, since we abstract from investment into climate resilient infrastructure, 
these resources should cover a significant part of the developing countries’ adaptation 
expenditures in the vulnerable sector. It is further assumed that funds are equally shared 
among the recipient regions and that they are used for adaptation only. In order to abstract 
from crowding-out effects funded regions do not autonomously invest into adaptation. 
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5 Results from Numerical Simulations 
5.1 TUMB: climate impacts, but no adaptation 
Without investment into adaptation, MITACC predicts that under ECHAM 5 A1B assump-
tions and compared to BASE climate change will cause losses in the production of vulnerable, 
which by mid-century aggregate to 4.5% of the Gross World Product. Losses are not equally 
distributed across regions. The higher is a region’s exposure to climate change, the higher are 
the impacts on agriculture and other vulnerable sectors. And the larger is the share of vulnera-
ble sectors, the higher will be the welfare effects. 
As Figure 1 shows, compared to BASE Oceania’s (OCE) output of vulnerable is reduced by 
more than 50% under TUMB assumptions. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SAF), South America 
(SAM) and South Asia (SOA) a cut-back of 69%, 64% and 28%, respectively, is expected. 
The former Soviet Union (GUS) and North America (NAF), however, can extend the produc-
tion of vulnerable by 13% and 11%, respectively. In these regions agriculture can benefit 
from global climate change. And since these regions produce a significant portion of world’s 
food supply, agricultural production world-wide will decline by only 5.1% in 2050. 
 
Figure 1:  Effects of climate change on regional outputs by 2050 (in % compared to BASE) 
 
By definition the production of non-vulnerable such as personal computers is not directly af-
fected by climate change. Nonetheless, indirect impacts can be important. In Sub-Sahara Afri-
ca (SAF) and South America (SAM), where vulnerable production heavily declines, a cut-
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back of non-vulnerable outputs by almost 50% is observed. Therefore these regions cannot 
compensate the shortfall of vulnerable production through selling more non-vulnerable, which 
makes the argument that shifting agricultural production towards north could be a kind of 
climate change adaptation (see Juliá and Duchin, 2007) a questionable one.  
Interregional reallocation of production and international competitiveness go hand in hand. 
Obviously, countries with highest exposure to climate change will face the largest losses in 
competitiveness. As the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index (Balassa, 1965) indi-
cates, in South America (SAM) and Oceania (OCE) the competiveness of vulnerable produc-
tion is reduced by 10% and 7%, respectively. Regions, which are confronted with negligible 
climate change impacts like East Asia (EAS), realize small gains in competitiveness. Closely 
related are changes in terms-of-trade. Highly affected regions such SAM or SAF face signifi-
cant terms-of-trade deterioration (11% and 8%), whereas regions such as GUS, where impacts 
are either negligible or positive, slightly improve their terms-of-trade. 
5.2 AUTO: climate change and autonomous adaptation 
Assume for a moment that all regions autonomously and optimally adapt to climate change. 
That means, each region r chooses a level of adaptation, such that marginal damages equal 
marginal adaptation costs, hence (see conditions (2) and (3)) 
(6)   𝐴𝑟(𝑡) =  �𝐺𝐷𝑟(𝑡)𝛾𝑟𝛽𝑟 � 1𝛽−1. 
By comparing AUTO and TUMB consequences of optimal adaptation become obviously. The 
necessary expenditure (see Table 1) spreads from almost zero (EAS) to more than 8% of 
regional GDP in Oceania (OCE), Sub-Saharan Africa (SAF) and South America (SAM). This 
mainly follows from high exposure and the economic size of vulnerable production. In 
absolute terms, investment into adaptation is highest in SAM. It accounts to almost 30 billion 
US$ by 2050, which is almost twice as much as North America (NAF) has to spend on 
optimal adaptation and is still 10 times higher than Europe’s adaptation expenditure. 
Moderating climate change affects the production of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable. 
Relative to TUMB, the former Soviet Union (GUS) and South America (SAM) can increase 
the outputs of vulnerable by 21% and 18%. Simultaneously, outputs of non-vulnerable are 
extended by 12% and 10%, respectively (see Figure 2). In Europe (EUR) and East Asia (EAS) 
outputs of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable will slightly be reduced. 
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 Adaptation Costs by 2050 Adaptation Level 
Region % of GDP Billion US $ % of Gross Impacts  
EAS 0.04 0.919 6.62 
EUR 0.18 2.947 12.81 
GUS 4.86 9.218 22.86 
MEN 0.87 2.806 14.71 
NAF 1.34 17.429 14.44 
OCE 8.18 6.699 27.03 
SAF 8.15 10.535 32.84 
SAM 8.87 29.802 36.87 
SOA 1.00 7.404 14.420 
 
Table 1: Costs and benefits of autonomous adaptation by 2050 (Adaptation lev-
els are expressed as fraction of damages avoided in the vulnerable sector.) 
 
 
 Figure 2: Change in sector outputs by 2050 (in % relative to TUMB)  
This indicates that adaptation takes influence on the regions’ comparative advantage. 
However, since a region’s competitiveness is driven by several factors like for example 
differences in cost-efficiency of adaptation, effects are not always clear and might differ by 
sector. For example, optimal adaptation increases South America’s (SAM) competitiveness in 
the production of vulnerable (see Figure 3). The less exposed East Asia (EAS) loses 
competitiveness both in vulnerable and non-vulnerable, while Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF), 
which is one of the regions with the largest exposure, loses competitiveness in vulnerable 
production, but wins in non-vulnerable. 
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Figure 3: Percentage change in Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) by 2050 (relative to TUMB) 
 
Figure 4: Percentage change in terms-of-trade by 2050 (relative to TUMB) 
This is also reflected by changes in terms-of-trade (see Figure 4). While GUS and SAM can 
improve their terms-of-trade through adaptation, Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) loses even more 
ground on the international markets. 
5.3 FUND: climate impacts and the funding of adaptation 
As described FUND assumes: (1) Europe (EUR), Oceania (OCE) and North America (NAF) 
support adaptation in Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF), South America (SAM) and South Asia (SOA). (2) 
Starting in 2015 from 0.0125% of their GDP the donors linearly increase their contributions, 
until these reach 0.1% in 2050. (3) Funds are equally shared among the recipients. 
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Figure 5 shows the effects of funding adaptation on regional production (as the percentage 
differences in sector outputs between FUND and TUMB). All funded regions can profit in 
both vulnerable and non-vulnerable outputs.  
Recall that within our approach AUTO describes a Pareto-optimal scenario. Hence AUTO 
sets a benchmark for the performance of FUND, where all regions autonomously invest into 
optimal adaptation except for SAF, SAM and SOA, which receive financial assistance. 
 Adaptation Costs by 2050 Adaptation Level 
Region % of GDP Billion US $ % of Gross Impacts 
EAS 0.04 0.921 6.62 
EUR 0.18 2.950 12.81 
GUS 4.86 9.235 22.86 
MEN 0.87 2.809 14.71 
NAF 1.34 17.457 14.44 
OCE 8.18 6.716 27.03 
SAF 8.61 11.172 33.31 
SAM 3.30 11.172 28.73 
SOA 1.53 11.172 16.40 
Table 2: Costs and benefits of funding adaptation by 2050 (regions in italics receive funding) 
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Figure 5: Effect on sector outputs by 2050 (in percent relative to TUMB) 
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By comparing Tables 1 and 2 it becomes obvious that virtually no differences exist between 
AUTO and FUND except for the funded countries. In case of Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) funded 
adaptation is close to optimality. South America (SAM) is under-supplied financially, while 
South Asia (SOA) is over-funded. Consequently, since the funding is completely invested into 
adaptation, adaptation in both cases is sub-optimal. This must have effects on the regions’ 
terms-of-trade and Relative Comparative Advantage (RCA). 
Figure 7: Change in Relative Comparative Advantage by 2050 (relative to TUMB) 
As in AUTO South America (SAM) and South Asia (SOA) profit from terms-of-trade im-
provements through adaptation, while Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) loses (compare Figure 4 and 
6). Similarly, the donor regions EUR (-0.27%) and OCE (-3.2%) have to cope with loses in 
terms-of-trade, while NAF more or less stays unchanged. However, the effects are more pro-
nounced than in AUTO. The same applies, if changes in RCA (relative to TUMB) are consid-
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Figure 6: Changes in terms-of-trade through adaptation funding in 2050 (in % relative to TUMB) 
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ered (compare Figures 3 and 7). There are slight differences in the order of magnitude, but 
effects point into the same direction. 
Overall the results indicate that no qualitative differences between AUTO and FUND exist 
and that the quantitative differences are rather minor. Intuitively this is not surprising. AUTO 
defines a Pareto-efficient solution, but might require significant financial resources, which 
exceed the abilities of the poorest. FUND is an adaptation scenario, where policy has decided 
on supporting adaptation in the least developed countries through North-to-South transfers. 
As such FUND approaches AUTO, but does not grant a Pareto-efficient allocation of adapta-
tion. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage change in social welfare (FUND to TUMB) for different welfare aggregation criteria 
This immediately raises the question of the rational for funding adaptation in the developing 
world? According to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion this is the case, if aggregated welfare gains at 
least compensate the costs. Figure 8 shows that, depending on the aggregation criteria, fund-
ing adaptation by spending 0.1% of the industrialized regions’ GDP could turn out beneficial 
globally. However, Figure 8 also shows that depending on the welfare criteria funding levels 
exist, above which funding adaptation is counterproductive. If a Bentham principle through 
summing up the regions’ welfare is applied, the beak-even level is relatively small (0.003%). 
A Nash welfare aggregation scheme, where individual welfare levels are multiplied with each 
other, would support a funding below 0.3% and under Rawls, where aggregated welfare cor-
respond to the loss of the most affected agent, even a funding of 1% of GDP would be justi-
fied. This shows that, depending on the social welfare function, funding of adaptation in the 
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developing world could be welfare improving and be justified under the Hicks-Kaldor criteri-
on.  
6 Conclusions 
In 2011 the COP meeting at Durban failed to establish an international agreement on green-
house gas abatement, which extends the existing Kyoto Protocol. This directed attention on 
adaptation, which consists of measures for reducing the follow-up costs of climate change. 
This paper uses MITACC, a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, where impacts 
of climate change and variability depend on changes both of temperature and precipitation, 
for analyzing the interplay between international trade, regional adaptation and the North-to-
South funding of adaptation. If all regions, even the least developed ones, would own the nec-
essary resources for adapting optimally to climate change, by mid-of-the-century at maximum 
10% of the domestic GDP would be invested into adaptation for avoiding almost 40% of cli-
mate change induced damages. In absolute terms global adaptation expenditure would ac-
count to more than 85 billion US$ by 2050, where 47.741 billion should be invested in SAF, 
SAM and SOA. This is significantly above Stern’s (2006) estimates but in the middle of the 
range the World Bank (2007) has projected.  
Without North-to-South transfers the least developed regions won’t own the necessary re-
sources for optimally adapting to climate change and variability. Transfers are typically de-
termined through policy negotiation and cannot be expected being efficient. Nonetheless, if 
sufficiently high, they could allow for approaching a Pareto efficient allocation of adaptation. 
As is usual in case of transfers, adaptation funding affects world trade and regions’ relative 
comparative advantage. Now, since adaptation immediately reduces the negative impacts of 
climate change on the production of vulnerable, one would expect that the most affected re-
gions of the South could profit from funding adaptation. However, since the effects of adapta-
tion and its funding on international trade and production depend on the regional differences 
in the adaptation cost curves, the results are by no means clear-cut. For example, while South 
America (SAM) can increase its comparative advantage in the production of vulnerable, Sub-
Sahara Africa (SAF) has to cope with a deterioration of its competitiveness in vulnerable on 
the one hand, but can increase its competitiveness in non-vulnerable on the other.  
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Appendix 
Region Countries covered α1 α2 α3 γ β 
Oceania (OCE) Aus, Nzl,  3.209 0.275 0.013 5.653 3.238 
East Asia (EAS) Chn, Jpn, Kor, Twn 0.068 0.006 0.002 6.756 3.604 
South Asia (SOA) Ind, Idn, Mal, Tha, … 0.140 0.012 0.005 5.623 3.629 
North America (NAF) Usa, Can, Mex 0.520 0.045 0.002 8.234 3.319 
South America (SAM) Bra, Arg, Col, Ven, … 1.532 0.107 0.007 5.162 4.051 
Europe (EUR) EU27, Swi, Nor, Cro, … 0.128 0.014 0.009 5.956 3.938 
Former SU (GUS) Rus, Rest of GIS 0.984 0.084 0.004 6.499 3.318 
Middle East (MEN) Tur, Mor, Rest of ME, … 0.103 0.009 0.042 12.412 3.790 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) Zaf, Tan, Zwe, …  1.177 0.087 0.059 6.653 3.955 
 
Table A1: Regional disaggregation, calibrated impact and adaptation cost parameter 
 
Elasticities of substitution Value 
Aggregate commodities to GDP 0.2 
Capital – labor in vulnerable 1.09 
Capital - labor in non-vulnerable 1.29 
KL – intermediates in vulnerable Leontief 
KL – intermediates in non-vulnerable Leontief 
Armington vulnerable 2.16 
Armington non-vulnerable 2.57 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1 
Table A3: Elasticities of substitution 
